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CASES NOTED
sensitivity to consumer protection, the Supreme Court of Florida has taken
a giant step backwards and has issued "an invitation to the unfair
lender ...,4 to take unconscionable advantage of the unwary borrower.
PAUL H. FREEMAN
COMITY: AN EFFECTIVE BAR TO COLLATERAL ATTACK-
OF A FOREIGN COURT'S JURISDICTION
AFTER JUDGMENT
Defendant, Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., an American concern,
planned to introduce "Tarzan chewing gum" into England in conjunction
with the English plaintiff, Somportex, Ltd. The plans never reached
fruition. Alleging the existence and breach of a contract, the English
firm sought damages in the English courts. Extraterritorial service was
had on the American defendant under an English long-arm statute.' The
American firm responded by making a conditional appearance, permitted
under English procedure,2 to contest jurisdiction. The American defen-
dant then attempted to withdraw its appearance, but the court refused.
Its jurisdictional objections were overruled,8 which had the effect, under
English law, of converting the conditional appearance into an uncondi-
tional one.4 On the basis of a second motion, the American company was
given permission to withdraw from the proceedings.5 The English Court
of Appeal, however, reversed the lower court ruling which had allowed
the American firm to withdraw; this placed Philadelphia Chewing Gum
in the position of having entered an unconditional appearance.' The
defendant made no further appearance in the English proceedings, even
though the jurisdictional finding was apparently still open to appeal.7
A default judgment was, thereafter, entered.' Enforcement of the English
judgment was then sought in the federal district court in Philadelphia,
where the English plaintiff was granted a summary judgment.9 On appeal,
47. Id.
1. The English company obtained leave of court, under R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7, to
serve notice of its suit extraterritorially.
2. R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7. A conditional appearance has an effect similar to that of a
special appearance under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
3. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., [1968] 3 All E.R. 26.
4. R. S. C. 1965, Ord. 12, r. 7.
5. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., [1968] 3 All E.R. 26.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id.
8. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
9. Id.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held, affirmed:
the English judgment should be recognized on the basis of comity; the
American defendant could not, under these circumstances, choose the
forum in which it would litigate the basis of the English court's jurisdic-
tion. Since the English procedures were in accord with American notions
of due process, the defendant, having waived the opportunity to contest
the jurisdictional question in the English courts, was conclusively bound
by the foreign judgment. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
The English judgment was recognized on the basis of comity, a
concept much abused of late by the commentators because of its imprecise
and misunderstood meaning.' ° With few exceptions, however, the reported
cases reveal a pattern of recognition and enforcement of international
judgments." The concept's classic formulation is this:
"Comity," in its legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.'"
Comity receives its interpretation from the law of the forum in which
recognition is sought; it is the basis on which the forum will recognize
a judgment of a foreign court.'8 On a more elevated plane, comity can
be said to be "a statement of the conflict of laws rules of the forum"
with regard to international judgments. 4 Because of the relative infre-
quency" of cases involving international judgments, the conceptual con-
tent of comity and the defenses which can be raised under it are as yet
10. Comity has been labeled by the commentators as "a word of loose and uncertain
meaning," Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLuM. L.
Rav. 783, 784 (1950); "chameleonic as its legal uses are varied," Smit, International Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 44, 53 (1962) ; and
as an "undefined and virtually undefinable principle," Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign
Country Judgments, 24 Onio ST. L.J. 291, 293 (1963).
11. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLum. L.
REv. 783 (1950); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law,
33 MICH. L. Rav. 1129 (1935); Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24
OHIo ST. L.J. 291 (1963).
12. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
13. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONrICT OF LAws § 45 at 163 (1962).
14. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 783, 784 (1950).
15. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 CoLUtr. L. REv. 221, 237 (1941);
Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 295-96 (1963).
Professor Nussbaum's research, which uncovered 63 reported cases dealing with foreign
country judgments in the period from 1896 to 1936, lead him to conclude such judgments
are "extremely rare in this country." However, Professor Peterson disputes this conclusion,
claiming to have uncovered an additional 130 reported cases in the same 40-year period.
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imprecisely defined. However, with the continued growth of international
trade, cases involving international judgments will be more frequent.
These cases will establish the boundaries of "comity," and will mark
out the forum's conflicts rules with respect to foreign judgments. These
decisions, spelling out the terms on which foreign judgments will be
recognized, will be stare decisis within the forum.
It is true that comity is not a rule of international law."6 But once
adopted by the forum, comity is a part of its conflicts of laws rules.
It is submitted then that it cannot be said without some qualification, that
comity "is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expedi-
ency. Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity
does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation." 7 As perceived
by the Third Circuit in Somportex, comity is little more than a halfway
house between duty and courtesy. This is correct, but only so far as
international obligations, duties, and laws are concerned. Once it is em-
bedded in the decisional law of the forum, it is as much a part of the
forum's law as a principle of contract or tort law. And, as the cases
dealing with comity increase in number, its conceptual content will be
more precisely defined and predictability will increase. The stare decisis
effect of comity was tacitly conceded by the Third Circuit when it
acknowledged comity to be its "governing standard" under applicable
Pennsylvania precedents. 8 The same effect would bind a Pennsylvania
court.'9 Once proclaimed as the law of the forum, comity and the defenses
available under it remain the law until overturned by the appropriate
court within the forum.
Despite some authority to the contrary,2 ° the reported cases are
not in agreement on whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to
foreign judgments. And where the cases do employ res judicata termi-
nology, in deciding what effect is to be given an extranational judgment,
res judicata comes into play only after the foreign judgment is recognized
on the basis of comity. In New York, where there are several leading
decisions on the res judicata effects of foreign judgments, recent decisions
have made clear that comity remains the underpinning of whatever res
judicata effect is granted an internationally foreign judgment. In Rosen-
baum v. Rosenbaum,2 the New York Court of Appeals noted that "under
16. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.L.A.L. &V. 44, 53 (1962).
17. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971).
18. Id., citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Svenska Handelsbanken
v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966).
19. In re Christoff's Estate, 411 Pa. 419, 192 A.2d 737 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
965 (1964).
20. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLxm. L.
REv. 783, 789 (1950).
21. 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
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comity-as contrasted with full faith and credit--our courts have power
to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries
for policy reasons."22
The scope of the res judicata effect granted in New York to an
international judgment was dealt with in Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp."
There the Court of Appeals, after again making clear that comity was
the basis of its recognition of a French judgment, held that French res
judicata rules would properly have governed the case, had French law
been pleaded and proven. The same approach, that of examining the res
judicata rules of the rendering court to determine what scope should
be given to an international judgment, was utilized in Bata v. Hill,24 an
internationally celebrated case which refused collateral estoppel effect to
a Dutch judgment. "[C]ollateral estoppel," the Delaware court held,
"only applies where . . . the court rendering the first determination will
itself thereafter give conclusive effect to its own determination."2 English
cases have reached the same result.2
Enforcement of an international judgment on the basis of the res
judicata rules of the forum, without reference to comity or to the res
judicata rules of the forum which rendered the judgment, has, however,
been advocated.
Once a foreign judgment is recognized, it will be given the same
effect . . . that it would have in subsequent proceedings in the
foreign forum. This procedure is perhaps reconcilable with the
doctrines that base the recognition of foreign judgments on
comity or on a presumed legal obligation created by the foreign
judgment, but it is indefensible under a res judicata rationale.
A contrary rule, making the extent of the local effect of
foreign judgments dependent directly on domestic principles,
would seem to find strong support in both logic and application.
22. Id. at 375, 130 N.E.2d at 903.
23. 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970).
24. 37 Del. Ch. 96, 139 A.2d 159 (1958), modified sub nom., Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch.
258, 163 A.2d 493 (1960), reh. denied, 39 Del. Ch. 548, 170 A.2d 711, cert. denied, 366 U.S.
964 (1961).
25. Id. at 127, 139 A.2d at 176.
26. E.g., Cari-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keller, Ltd., [1967] 1 A.C. 853; [1966] 3
W.L.R. 125; [1966] 2 All E.R. 536.
27. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 44, 63 (1962).
Professor Leflar may be staking out yet another position when he writes: "Common
law principles of res judicata are as applicable in American courts to judgments rendered in
foreign countries as to those rendered in the United States." B. LmaFAR, AmERiCAN CoNucTrs
LAW § 74 at 171 (1968). Ignoring as it does the differences between the res judicata effects
accorded judgments in common law and in civil law jurisdictions, Leflar's statement finds
little, if any, support in the cases. Cf., e.g., Palmarito de Cauto Sugar Co. v. Warner, 225 App.
Div. 261, 232 N.Y.S. 569 (1929), wherein res judicata effect was denied a Cuban bankruptcy
decree because under Cuban law the bankruptcy decree would not preclude the action at
hand. Also, see note 24 and accompanying text.
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It is submitted, however, that such a rule would vary res judicata as
presently employed in both domestic and international situations.28 More-
over, enforcement of the res judicata rules of the forum where recog-
nition is sought could give the internationally foreign judgment a scope
and effect beyond that accorded the judgment in the country where it
originated.29 Under the approach advanced by Professor Smit,30 the res
judicata effect given the foreign judgment in the recognizing forum would
have no necessary correlation to its res judicata effects in the court which
rendered the judgment. The rights, obligations, and duties of the litigants
would expand or contract depending, fortuitously, on the res judicata
rules of the country where a judgment creditor seeks enforcement.
Without employing res judicata terminology, the Third Circuit, in
Somportex, refused to review the English jurisdictional finding, holding
that the English courts had jurisdiction to decide the question of local
jurisdiction."' The result was in conformity with Chief Justice Marshall's
holding in Rose v. Himley,82 where the difference between local jurisdic-
tion and jurisdiction in the international sense became embedded in
American conflicts law. Marshall established this rule for the recognition
of foreign judgments in the United States:
Of its own jurisdiction, so far as depends on municipal rules,
the courts of a foreign nation must judge, and its decision must
be respected. But if it exercises a jurisdiction which, according
to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer, however
available its sentences may be within the dominions of the prince
from whom the authority is derived, they are not regarded by
foreign courts. The distinction is taken upon this principle, that
the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of
nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all.3
The Somportex decision on the local jurisdiction question was reached
without reliance on Rose v. Himley or other cases involving recognition
of foreign judgments. Instead, the Third Circuit relied on Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Association,34 a case which dealt with the
enforcement in one federal district of a default judgment rendered by
another federal district court. Constitutional full faith and credit35 was
28. "The effect of a valid judgment upon the rights or other interests of the parties and
persons in privity with them is determined by the law of the state where the judgment
was rendered." RESTATEMENT, CoNFIICT OF LAWS § 450, at 533 (1934).
29. Cf., Bata v. Hill, 37 Del. Ch. 96, 139 A.2d 159 (1958), modified sub nom., Bata v.
Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (1960), reh. denied, 39 Del. Ch. 548, 170 A.2d 711,
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
30. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
31. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
32. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240 (1808).
33. Id. at 275-76.
34. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
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held not to apply to such situations. The defendant in Baldwin entered
a special appearance, but received an adverse ruling on the jurisdictional
question. A default judgment was later entered. The Supreme Court,
relying on the policy of favoring an end to litigation, held that the
defendant was not entitled to another opportunity to relitigate the juris-
dictional issue. The Third Circuit found this same policy applicable to
the international judgment at issue in Somportex, holding that "defendant
cannot choose its forum to test the factual basis of jurisdiction. It was
given, and it waived, the opportunity of making the adequate presentation
in the English court."86 The American firm's objection to the conversion
of its conditional appearance to contest jurisdiction into a general one
was rejected."7 The court pointed out that the corresponding Federal 8
and Pennsylvaniael procedural rules have the same effect. The court in
Somportex also pointed out4° that, in York v. Texas,4 due process was
held not to require that a state court permit special appearances for the
limited purpose of contesting jurisdiction.
The notion of jurisdiction in the international sense, i.e., whether
the requirements of basic due process were satisfied, was tacitly recognized
and applied by the Third Circuit in Somportex. Well-established in
American conflicts law, the distinction is also recognized by the English
courts. However the English cases have added little clarity to the notion.
The English test for determining whether a foreign court properly had
jurisdiction in the international sense was set out on one occasion42
as conformity with "natural justice" and on another occasion as the
"normally recognized limits of territorial jurisdiction."43 What the English
cases, as well as their American counterparts, seem to mean is that a
foreign judgment will be recognized if the foreign court claimed juris-
diction under its rules and if the foreign court's jurisdictional procedures
comport with those of the forum in which recognition is sought. There is
some American authority for the proposition that a foreign judgment, if
it is to be recognized in this country, must conform to the constitutional
requirements of due process. In Griffin v. Griffin," the Supreme Court
said, in dictum, that no American court will "give effect, even as a matter
of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process.
'45
36. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3d Cir.
1971).
37. Id.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
39. PA. R. Civ. P. 1451(a)(7).
40. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 442 n.11 (1971).
41. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
42. Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 796.
43. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1954] 1 Ch. 37,
rejecting an injunction under the Sherman Anti-trust Act in United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
44. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
45. Id. at 229.
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However, some commentators" and some cases47 have suggested that
something less than complete due process will sustain recognition of a
foreign judgment, provided there is notice and hearing in accordance
with foreign law. More authoritative, perhaps, is the treatment in Hilton
v. Guyot4" of the defendant's objections to enforcement of a French
judgment on due process grounds. The court held:
It is next objected that in those (French) courts one of the
plaintiffs was permitted to testify not under oath, and was not
subjected to cross examination by the opposite party, and that
the defendants were, therefore, deprived of safeguards that are
by our law considered essential to secure honesty and to detect
fraud in a witness; and also that documents and papers were
admitted in evidence, with which the defendants had no connec-
tion, and which would not be admissible under our own system
of jurisprudence. . . . [Since] the practice followed and the
method of examining witnesses were according to the laws of
France, we are not prepared to hold that the fact that the pro-
cedure in these respects differed from that of our own courts is,
of itself, a sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judg-
ment.49
In Somportex, the Third Circuit found the English jurisdictional pro-
cedures employed there to be in conformity with constitutional due
process. 0 Hence the court was not required to decide if something else
than complete due process in securing jurisdiction would sustain recogni-
tion of a foreign judgment in this country.
The judicial economy exhibited by the Third Circuit in deciding
whether the English court hand "jurisdiction in the international sense"
typifies the decision as a whole, a very restrained and correct one. The
court gave binding effect to the English court's holding that local juris-
diction was proper under English law. Thus Somportex is blended into
a line of well reasoned cases dating from the early days of the Republic.
46. A. EnRENZWEIO, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 59 at 213 (1962), where
the author says that foreign procedures must "conform, at least substantially, to the re-
quirements of constitutional due process;" B. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 73 at 167
(1968), where the author states that conformity with "basic concepts of due process" is
sufficient to warrant recognition and enforcement of an internationally foreign judgment.
See, Von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
Suggested Approach, 81 HIv. L. Rav. 1601 (1968) for a policy-oriented analysis suggesting
that recognition practice with regard to internationally foreign judgments could be more
permissive than that dealing with interestate judgments.
47. E.g., Henderson v. Drake, 138 Cal. App. 2d 621, 292 P.2d 254 (1956); Dunstan v.
Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893). Such decisions are in a numerical minority, even
in their home states, with the majority view represented by Boivin v. Tacott, 102 F. Supp.
979 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
48. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
49. Id. at 204-05.
50. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1971).
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The court accomplished this without becoming embroiled in the academic
controversy over the res judicata effects to be accorded internationally
foreign judgments, a controversy which seems destined to confuse, rather
than clarify an already difficult concept.
JOSEPH P. AVERrLL
RESCISSION OF AN AUTO SALE UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE-HOW TO GET RID OF
A FOUR-WHEELED LEMON
Plaintiff purchased a new 1970 Jaguar automobile from defendant
dealer. Express warranties were made in the sales contract and the war-
ranty booklet, both of which were given to plaintiff upon delivery of the
vehicle. The booklet additionally disclaimed any warranty not specifically
mentioned and limited plaintiff's remedies to the repair or replacement of
defects. Both the disclaimer and limitation clauses were in the same size,
style, color, and print as the remaining portions of the booklet. Problems
in the steering, air conditioning, and doors developed almost immediately.
The vehicle also developed a tendency to stop for no apparent reason.
After three months, during which defendant had possession for repair
purposes for approximately fifty percent of the time, plaintiff sued for
rescission, or alternatively, for damages for breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability. The trial court ordered defendant to transfer
to plaintiff a new 1970 Jaguar with equipment comparable to that of
the non-conforming vehicle. When compliance with this order was found
to be impossible,' an amended final judgment was then entered, awarding
damages of $6,500.00, the market value of the car on that date. Since
the original price of the vehicle was $7,676.00, plaintiff was forced to
bear the depreciation loss of $1,176.00. Defendant appealed, and plaintiff
cross-appealed on the depreciation assessment. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held, affirmed: The limitations and disclaimers
were ineffective, rescission was proper, but plaintiff must bear the depre-
ciation. Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies,
Inc., 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
The decision in the instant case turned substantially on interpre-
tations of various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code,' which
has been adopted in all jurisdictions except Louisiana.' Dade County
Dairies presented a case of first impression for Florida in dealing with
1. The action did not come to trial until the latter part of 1971, and vehicles which
could comply with the court's order were unavailable.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Code."
3. Florida was one of the last states to do so, adopting the Code on Jan. 1, 1967. See
FLA. STAT. § 680.101 (1971).
